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Abstract 
An agency problem regarding moral hazard of individual borrowers within lending contracts is efficiently 
addressed with supervisory practices, especially sponsorship and endorsement that lead to selecting the optimal 
project (with higher expected return and lower risk) and the optimal control of borrowers. According to a recent 
study, there is a liability constraint of the endorsement that plays as an incentive mechanism for better projects 
selecting and an incentive constraint of the sponsorship that plays for better monitoring of borrowers, (Kamalan, 
2018). Although the conclusions are very relevant in economics with a broad range of applications in management 
field, especially in marketing, the results of the modelling remain theoretical. The overall objective of this study 
is to analyze the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms on maturity repayment behavior of borrowers and the time 
of exposure to default. Specifically, the article aims at testing empirically the causal effects of supervisory practices 
within lending contracts with a focus on the maturity repayment behavior of borrowers. 
First, we test the influence of supervisory incentives on the borrower’s behavior regarding maturity repayment 
with Logistic and Poisson regression. Second, we analyze the effects of supervisory incentives on credit’ life-time 
of borrowers with Kaplan-Meier and Cox regression. 
The findings attest that supervisory incentives are significantly powerful to lead borrowers to better maturity 
repayment behavior. The resulting model is significant to introduce into the search for the determinants of 
categories of "best" customers in maturity repayment and adversely, those mostly considered as vulnerable to 
delays that will lead to a real strategy of portfolio management.      
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1. Introduction 
Supervisory practices are defined as social relations networks and better known as non-market institutions within 
contracts. Since behavioral economists invite to the understanding of the complex economic and behavioral factors 
(known as non-market institutions) that affect the decisions of individuals within contracts, the understanding of 
the role of social relations networks within contracts has become a topic of increasing interest. There are pioneering 
works with Stiglitz (1974) on tenant farming, pursued by Laffont and Matoussi (1995) and renewed by Bidisha 
and al. (2018). It also concerns the gift-exchange and market nexus (Akerlof, 1982), extended by Bryson and 
Freeman (2018). Consequently, the impact of non-market institutions in terms of contract efficiency has been a 
topic of increasing interest in the theories of contracts, regarding transaction costs, property rights, incomplete 
contracts and agency relationships.  
To a better understanding of the role of such non-market institutions within contracts, a relevant method based on 
the principal-agent paradigm is largely used and address many topics: organization (Ashraf and Bandiera, 2018), 
management of public goods such as environment (Smith, 2018), etc. A specific concern is devoted to exploring 
the conditions of effectiveness of lending contracts and this concern is being raised by alternative banking firms 
such as cooperatives (Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, 1994; Besley, 1995) and microfinance institutions (Stiglitz, 
1990; Varian, 1990; Besley and Coate, 1995, Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier, 2000). In the studies, the 
neighborhood is supposed to have better information about borrowers and can thus exercise more effective control 
over them. In a context where information asymmetry (adverse selection and moral hazard) can degrade lending 
relationships, the commitment of the borrower's acquaintances can be used to solve such an information problem. 
This is the principle of peer review, first analyzed by Varian and then Stiglitz. These studies unanimously maintain 
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that taking peer review into account makes it possible to bring out non-opportunistic behaviors through solidarity 
guarantees, the possibility of social sanctions and long-term interactions. Peer review is then modelled as 
supervisor in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent model.  
Supervisory practices such as endorsement and sponsorship are, in this case, incentive devices that encourage the 
effort of borrower to not engage in too risky projects, Kamalan (2018) and then are seen as being important tool 
for reducing loan delinquency, (Cassar, Crowley and Wydick, 2007). Supervisory practices are shown theoretically 
to be a way of acquiring information on creditworthiness for reducing default risk, (Stiglitz, 1990), (Armendariz 
de Aghion and Gollier, 2000). 
In a model composed of a Principal, a Supervisor and an Agent such as the one developed by Banerjee, Besley and 
Guinnane (1994), supervisors are likely to have efficient effects on the agent’s behaviors due to the incentives that 
supervisors provide. 
The contribution of this article is to take into account supervisory practices known as sponsorship and endorsement 
within lending contracts, in order to questioning their effect in solving agency problem of moral hazard of 
borrowers, especially, in testing the effects of those practices on the maturity repayment of borrowers. As proposed 
in Kamalan (2019), we consider the lending institution (microfinance for example) as the Principal. The Supervisor 
is a no borrowing member of the same loan. It does not refer to joint liability member. The Endorsers and/or 
sponsors are considered supervisors engaged in the lending contracts. An endorser is known as a third party who 
provides a real collateral (salary for example) in return to the debt the borrower receives. According to a recent 
study, there is a liability constraint of the endorsement that plays as an incentive mechanism for better projects 
selecting (Kamalan 2018), and the sponsorship given by third parties plays for better monitoring of borrowers. The 
borrower is considered to be the Agent. Finally, a loan is represented by twelve monthly maturities and the number 
of maturities per borrower represents his/her total credit life time.  
Our analytical model is based on the framework of Bénabou and Tirole (2003). The authors analyze the effects of 
incentives on individuals' behavioral supply in the short and long term. This framework uses the principal-agent 
paradigm with asymmetric information. However, our study, which is intended to be applied, differs significantly 
from Bénabou and Tirole (Op. Cit.) in terms of mathematical modelling.  
In our study, we will analyze the effects of incentive mechanisms on borrowers' repayment behavior and on the 
credit’ life-time in four steps. First, we use a Logistic model to test the impact of supervisory practices on the 
probability of maturity repayment without failure for all borrowers. Second, we use Poisson regression analysis to 
test the impact of supervisory practices on the frequency of delays occurring in the repayment of maturities by 
loan borrowers with at least one delay. The number of delays is modelled as occurring at the frequency defined by 
a Poisson test, based on predictors. Third, we use the duration or survival analysis for the modelling of failures 
and credit’ life-time of borrowers. Credit’ life-time is modelled with the Kaplan-Meier graphs that provides failure 
estimates. Last, we use the Cox regression analysis to test the risk of default. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data, the methodological approach and model estimations. 
Section 3 provides the main findings and section 4 gives some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data, methods and model estimations 
2.1 Data and variables 
The data used in the econometric study of this article come from a survey conducted in Cotonou, (Benin, West 
Africa), in 2006. The study uses cross-sectional data from a sample of 832 borrowers. The sample includes 506 
individual loans borrowers, and 272 group loans, covering the population of 21146 customers in a microfinance 
institution called PADME in Cotonou (Note 1). The survey includes only borrowers in process of credit. We've 
developed a questionnaire submitted to the 832 people in the sample. We obtained several data concerning the loan 
relationship with the lending institution. We've produced from these data the variables of the study. 
The variables of the study are presented as follows. The dependent variables concern: 1-the delay (delay), it’s a 
binary variable that takes the value 1 for borrowers who have no delay and 0 for those who have at least one delay; 
2-the number of delays (nbr_delays) from 0 to 13 and 3-the number of maturities (maturities) from 0 to 132. (Note 
2). The explanatory variables are: 
- collateral: the type of collateral proposed by borrowers (plots, plots and other collateral, vehicles, salary, no real 
collateral). No real collateral refers to personal collateral i.e. the presence of supervisors. 
- penalty: the assessment of the penalty amount (acceptable, low, too high)  
- gift: receiving a gift (having received a gift, not having received a gift) 
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Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                                             
 worker for public/private      .3569816    .080303     4.45   0.000     .1995905    .5143727
                   service      .0056828   .0682189     0.08   0.934    -.1280238    .1393894
     crafts and processing     -.2593097   .0768788    -3.37   0.001    -.4099895     -.10863
 agriculture and livestock      .2690165   .1467824     1.83   0.067    -.0186717    .5567048
                       work  
                             
             2.loan_renewal    -.0533821   .0874795    -0.61   0.542    -.2248387    .1180745
                             
                university      .1146434   .1154171     0.99   0.321    -.1115699    .3408568
                 secondary     -.0603828   .0624856    -0.97   0.334    -.1828524    .0620868
                   primary     -.1711109   .0642775    -2.66   0.008    -.2970924   -.0451293
                  education  
                             
                 sponsored      .6237135   .0315918    19.74   0.000     .5617946    .6856324
                sponsorship  
                             
            not satisfying     -.0496813    .046833    -1.06   0.289    -.1414722    .0421097
                     amount  
                             
    having received a gift       .245437    .065727     3.73   0.000     .1166145    .3742595
                       gift  
                             
                  too high     -.1488234   .0453776    -3.28   0.001    -.2377617    -.059885
                       low       .201082   .1059496     1.90   0.058    -.0065754    .4087395
                    penalty  
                             
        no real collateral      .4027759   .0468463     8.60   0.000     .3109588    .4945931
                    salary      .2040393   .0733119     2.78   0.005     .0603505     .347728
                  vehicles      .0160433   .0769412     0.21   0.835    -.1347587    .1668453
plots and other collateral      .0646974   .1289143     0.50   0.616      -.18797    .3173648
                 collateral  
                                                                                             
                                   dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                         Delta-method
                                                                                             
- amount: the assessment of the received amount (acceptable, not satisfying) 
- sponsorship: the sponsorship status (sponsored, not sponsored) 
- education: education level (illiterate, primary, secondary, university) 
- loan_renewal: loan renewal (wishes for renewal; does not wish for new loan) 
- work: the main work (trade, agriculture and livestock, crafts and processing, service, worker for public/private) 
 
2.2 Methodological approaches and model estimations 
2.2.1 Logistic regression of default 
Let us consider that delay occurs randomly. Using the Logit model, we determine the factors that may explain the 
non-default of borrowers. This model is particular in explaining discrete variables that have two modalities. It 
provides the parameters of independent variables. It also provides the elasticity (dy/dx) consisting in the probability 
of the marginal effects. That indicates the change in the dependent variable relating to the move from the baseline 
modality of an independent variable to a specific study modality. The Logit model used is as follows: 
 	
_ = 0 + 1collateral_ + 2penalty_ + 3gift_ + 4amount_ + 5sponsorship_
+ 6education_ + 7renewal_ + 8work_ + ε 
 = 1, … 2  and 3 = 1, … 4 
Table 1. Marginal effects of Logistic regression 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
Author’ calculation 
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Once the factors that significantly explain the non-failure behavior are known, we focus on the way factors 
determine the frequency of failures. We use the Poisson model to count the number of delays (nbr_delays) made 
by borrowers who have experienced at least one default in the maturity repayments. 
 
2.2.2 Poisson regression of the number of delays 
The models to be estimated are: 
 nbr_delays_ = 0 + 1collateral_ + 2penalty_ + 3gift_ + 4amount_ + 5sponsorship_
+ 6education_ + 7renewal_ + 8work_ + ε 
 
67892: ; delays_
= Exp(0 + 1collateral_ + 2penalty_ + 3gift_ + 4amount_ + 5sponsorship_
+ 6education_ + 7renewal_ + 8work_ + ε) 
 
Table 2. Parameters of the Poisson regression model 
Author’ calculation 
                                                                                             
                      _cons     1.715729    .081921    20.94   0.000     1.555167    1.876291
                             
 worker for public/private      .2377009   .1564171     1.52   0.129    -.0688709    .5442728
                   service      -.140194   .0828787    -1.69   0.091    -.3026332    .0222453
     crafts and processing     -.0489618   .1444502    -0.34   0.735    -.3320791    .2341554
 agriculture and livestock     -1.029785   .2726292    -3.78   0.000    -1.564128   -.4954412
                       work  
                             
             2.loan_renewal    -.3213687   .1258398    -2.55   0.011    -.5680102   -.0747273
                             
                university      .1942727    .121285     1.60   0.109    -.0434415     .431987
                 secondary      .0177286   .0948311     0.19   0.852    -.1681369    .2035941
                   primary      -.032122    .099146    -0.32   0.746    -.2264446    .1622007
                  education  
                             
                 sponsored     -1.109489   .0812016   -13.66   0.000    -1.268641   -.9503364
                sponsorship  
                             
            not satisfying     -.1995117   .0626259    -3.19   0.001    -.3222563   -.0767671
                     amount  
                             
    having received a gift     -.1832903   .1026739    -1.79   0.074    -.3845275     .017947
                       gift  
                             
                  too high       .129707   .0648553     2.00   0.046      .002593     .256821
                       low     -.1491537   .1714484    -0.87   0.384    -.4851864    .1868789
                    penalty  
                             
                    salary     -.0893201   .1083369    -0.82   0.410    -.3016565    .1230164
                  vehicles      .1518812   .1020811     1.49   0.137    -.0481941    .3519565
plots and other collateral      .0781565   .1112801     0.70   0.482    -.1399485    .2962615
                 collateral  
                                                                                             
                 nbr_delays        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                             
Log likelihood = -650.28743                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1801
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(16)       =     285.69
Poisson regression                              Number of obs     =        321
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/EJBM 
Vol.11, No.12, 2019 
 
238 
2.2.3 Failure estimate and survival analysis 
Consider three maturities times: ′′, ′ and , such that AA < A < . The probability of a failure C occurring 
after time , is written: 
D(C > ) = D(C > A, C > ); D(C > ) = D(C >  | C > A) C D(C > ′) 
 
D(C > ) = D(C >  | C > A) C D(C > ′ | C > ′′) C D(C > ′′) 
The delay (failure) times are distinct G() ( = 1, … , 2) and ranked in ascending order. 
D(C > G()) = H DIC > G(J)K C > G(JLM))

JNM
 
When G(O) = 0, we have: 
P: the number of borrowers who may be defaulting just before the time G()   
Q: the number of "dead" borrowers, i. e. excluded from the loan portfolio at G(). 
Then the R probability that a borrower will be removed from the loan portfolio in the interval KG(LM), G()K, 
knowing that he was executing credit at G(LM); i.e. R = DIC ≤ G()  K C > G(LM))  
is estimated by:  
 DTU = VWXW 
 
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier failure and survival estimates with predictor Sponsorship 
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Table 3. Kaplan-Meier failure Table 
Author’ calculation 
 
Table 4. Kaplan-Meier survival Table 
Author’ calculation 
 
2.2.4 Hazard Ratio or instant risk of default with Cox regression 
Suppose a borrower defaults over a time interval set to [0, G]. Consider G the credit' life-time, which is a random 
and continuous variable, and  ≥ 0, a particular value of G.  
The survival function \() representing the probability of surviving after time  is given by:  
\() = D(G > ).  
  more  
   132       20     12      8             0.8873    0.0355     0.8070    0.9448
   120       24      4      0             0.7182    0.0438     0.6306    0.8002
   108       35      7      4             0.6618    0.0425     0.5785    0.7435
    96       66     15     16             0.5773    0.0393     0.5018    0.6549
    84       96     16     14             0.4529    0.0354     0.3866    0.5250
    72      138     18     24             0.3435    0.0301     0.2881    0.4062
    60      193     13     42             0.2450    0.0241     0.2014    0.2962
    48      270     18     59             0.1905    0.0206     0.1537    0.2348
    36      320     20     30             0.1327    0.0170     0.1030    0.1700
    24      427     20     87             0.0749    0.0122     0.0543    0.1029
    12      510     15     68             0.0294    0.0075     0.0178    0.0483
sponsored 
   132        4      0      4             0.9729    0.0122     0.9407    0.9901
   108        9      5      0             0.9729    0.0122     0.9407    0.9901
    96       26     12      5             0.9391    0.0155     0.9038    0.9647
    84       44     18      0             0.8868    0.0202     0.8438    0.9225
    72       66     18      4             0.8085    0.0242     0.7589    0.8534
    60      119     51      2             0.7367    0.0267     0.6832    0.7876
    48      158     33      6             0.5392    0.0292     0.4832    0.5973
    36      240     65     17             0.4176    0.0282     0.3646    0.4749
    24      301     48     13             0.2012    0.0225     0.1612    0.2497
    12      322     16      5             0.0497    0.0121     0.0307    0.0798
not sponsored 
                                                                               
  Time    Total   Fail   Lost           Function     Error     [95% Conf. Int.]
           Beg.          Net            Failure       Std.
   132       20     12      8             0.1127    0.0355     0.0552    0.1930
   120       24      4      0             0.2818    0.0438     0.1998    0.3694
   108       35      7      4             0.3382    0.0425     0.2565    0.4215
    96       66     15     16             0.4227    0.0393     0.3451    0.4982
    84       96     16     14             0.5471    0.0354     0.4750    0.6134
    72      138     18     24             0.6565    0.0301     0.5938    0.7119
    60      193     13     42             0.7550    0.0241     0.7038    0.7986
    48      270     18     59             0.8095    0.0206     0.7652    0.8463
    36      320     20     30             0.8673    0.0170     0.8300    0.8970
    24      427     20     87             0.9251    0.0122     0.8971    0.9457
    12      510     15     68             0.9706    0.0075     0.9517    0.9822
sponsored 
   132        4      0      4             0.0271    0.0122     0.0099    0.0593
   108        9      5      0             0.0271    0.0122     0.0099    0.0593
    96       26     12      5             0.0609    0.0155     0.0353    0.0962
    84       44     18      0             0.1132    0.0202     0.0775    0.1562
    72       66     18      4             0.1915    0.0242     0.1466    0.2411
    60      119     51      2             0.2633    0.0267     0.2124    0.3168
    48      158     33      6             0.4608    0.0292     0.4027    0.5168
    36      240     65     17             0.5824    0.0282     0.5251    0.6354
    24      301     48     13             0.7988    0.0225     0.7503    0.8388
    12      322     16      5             0.9503    0.0121     0.9202    0.9693
not sponsored 
                                                                               
  Time    Total   Fail   Lost           Function     Error     [95% Conf. Int.]
           Beg.          Net            Survivor      Std.
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The cdf (cumulative distribution function) of the random variable G representing the probability of defaulting 
before  is defined as follows:  
6() = D(G ≤ ) = 1 − \().  
The probability density which represents the probability of defaulting in a small time interval after time  is given 
by: 
;() = lim^→O
D( ≤ G <  + ℎ)
ℎ = 6
A() = −\′() 
The instant risk (Hazard ratio) for a fixed time t, indicates the probability of defaulting in a small time interval 
after t, conditionally to the fact of having survived until time t (i.e. the instant risk of default for those who survived) 
is: 
a() = lim^→O
D( ≤ G <  + ℎ | G ≥ )
ℎ =
;()
\() = −ln (\())′ 
Table 5. Parameters of Cox regression model 
 
Author’ calculation 
 
 
                                                                                             
 worker for public/private      1.060939   .3713813     0.17   0.866     .5342288    2.106945
                   service      1.487843   .2189146     2.70   0.007     1.115103    1.985176
     crafts and processing      1.505234   .3497764     1.76   0.078     .9545691    2.373562
 agriculture and livestock      2.346719   .9843001     2.03   0.042     1.031421    5.339324
                       work  
                             
             2.loan_renewal     1.190002   .2281939     0.91   0.364     .8171879      1.7329
                             
                university      .8573055   .2186612    -0.60   0.546     .5200334    1.413318
                 secondary      1.065974    .158604     0.43   0.668     .7963388    1.426905
                   primary      1.442361   .2220883     2.38   0.017      1.06662    1.950465
                  education  
                             
                 sponsored       .296511   .0328854   -10.96   0.000      .238581     .368507
                sponsorship  
                             
            not satisfying      1.160078   .1291669     1.33   0.182     .9326346    1.442988
                     amount  
                             
    having received a gift      .4732834   .0874953    -4.05   0.000     .3294282    .6799575
                       gift  
                             
                  too high      .9275552   .1018448    -0.68   0.493     .7479603    1.150273
                       low      .5628246   .1874635    -1.73   0.084     .2929936    1.081155
                    penalty  
                             
        no real collateral      .6987949   .0878043    -2.85   0.004     .5462549    .8939312
                    salary      .9787335   .1901043    -0.11   0.912      .668854     1.43218
                  vehicles      1.419616   .2835434     1.75   0.079     .9597503    2.099827
plots and other collateral       .791176   .1896788    -0.98   0.329     .4945425    1.265735
                 collateral  
                                                                                             
                         _t   Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                             
Log likelihood  =   -2351.1728                  Prob > chi2      =      0.0000
                                                LR chi2(17)      =      196.56
Time at risk    =        40704
No. of failures =          424
No. of subjects =          832                  Number of obs    =         832
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties
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3. Findings 
We performed the following tests to confirm the relevance of our results: the Pearson's test for the Logit model, 
Pearson's deviance test for the Poisson model, proportional risk test, Wald's test and likelihood ratio test for the 
Cox model. In addition, we tested the presence of endogeneity and corrected with the instrumental variable method. 
 
3.1 Effects of supervisory practices on borrower’s behavior 
3.1.1 Effects on maturity repayment behavior with logistic regression 
The estimated Logit model is overall significant. 78.73% of the non-delay behavior is significantly related to the 
explanatory variables of the model.  
Supervisory practices known as endorsement and sponsorship positively affects borrowers' behavior for not failing 
maturities. Sponsorship and endorsement highlight the role of personal collateral in loan efficiency. In Table 1, 
when moving from borrowers who have given a plot of land as collateral to those who gave any real collateral i.e. 
who proposed supervisors, the probability of not defaulting increases significantly by 40.3%. Sponsorship 
positively affects borrowers' behavior for non-delay. Moving from a non-sponsored borrower to a sponsored one, 
the probability of not defaulting increases significantly by 62.4%.  
Several other factors have an attractive incentive effect on the maturity repayment behavior without delay.  The 
reward as incentives given by the principal contribute positively to the payment of maturities without any delay 
by borrowers. Receiving a gift may increase the probability of not defaulting by 24.5%. However, other factors 
have negative effects on maturity repayment without delay: the primary education level, crafts and proceeding 
activities, for example. 
3.1.2 Effects on the number of delays with Poisson regression 
The Poisson model estimate highlights the frequency of delays made by borrowers who have defaulted at least 
once. The deviance test that indicates the adequacy of the Poisson model, provides a deviance probability about 
0.0444<0.05, suitable for reading the results. The results in Table 2 indicate that sponsorship positively reduces 
the frequency of maturity delayed payment: Coef = -1.1094. we’ve compute the estimated marginal effect that 
indicates 33.0% drop in the frequency of defaults from non-sponsored borrowers to sponsored ones.  
Other factors are beneficial in reducing the frequency of maturity delayed payment. Rewards are powerful factors 
that reduce the frequency of maturity delayed payment. In Table 2, incentives in the form of gifts received by 
borrowers significantly reduce the frequency of delays. The estimated marginal effect indicates 83.2% drop in the 
frequency of defaults from borrowers who did not receive a gift to those who did. Similarly, the possibility of 
credit renewal, the work in agriculture and livestock are significantly leading to the reduction in the frequency of 
delays in maturity repayments. 
3.2 Effects of supervisory practices in credit’ life-time analysis 
3.2.1 Effects on the failure and survival functions with Kaplan-Meier 
The Figure 1 shows the non-parametric failure and survival estimates with the predictor sponsorship. It describes 
the trend in borrowers' default and survival according to the sponsorship status. The basic idea is that, when a 
borrower incurs defaults, he or she gets closer to the end of the credit’ life-time. For the Kaplan-Meier non 
parametric estimator, when a borrower survives a default at maturity time , it means the borrower is alive just 
before , and he does not die at  time (Note 3). Kaplan-Meier failure and survival estimates are very different 
while comparing non-sponsored borrowers to those who are sponsored. Non-sponsored borrowers have 
significantly higher failure rates and are more likely to die faster than sponsored borrowers. Table 3 presents the 
failure function, which is an estimate of the probability of default by borrowers over time. Time represents the 
number of maturities. 
The failure function evolves less quickly for borrowers who are sponsored. Table 3 shows that, for sponsored 
borrowers, the average default rate (50%) is reached at the 84th to 96th maturity dates, i.e. 7th to 8th loan. However, 
for non-sponsored borrowers, the average default rate is quickly reached before the end of the 4th loan. A 
completely opposite analysis must be done for Table 4 concerning the survival function. 
Table 3 and Table 4 provide an important characteristic about right censored observations. An observation is right 
censored if the person was alive at study termination or was lost to follow-up at any time during the study. Right 
censoring means that the survival time is only known to exceed a certain value. In this study, survival times are 
presented to be 12, 24, ..., 132. 
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3.2.2 Effects on the instant risk of failure with Cox regression 
To ascertain whether the results of our Cox model are significantly relevant, we performed the following three 
tests: the proportional risk test, the Wald test and the likelihood ratio test. The results in Table 5 show that each 
explanatory variable is affected by a hazard ratio, regardless the time period. This ratio indicates the risk of 
borrowers defaulting at maturity. When borrowers are sponsored, the risk of default given by Haz. Ratio is 
decreasing and quite low (0.296). When there is no material collateral proposed by the borrowers, i.e. when 
supervisors exist within the lending contract, the risk of failure becomes significant and decreasing with Haz. Ratio 
=0.699. Conversely, borrowers who offer a vehicle as collateral, those with a primary level of education, those 
whose main activity is agriculture or livestock, crafts, service activities; are highly vulnerable to maturity 
defaulting. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The credit repayment behavior of borrowers has always been a key issue for financial institutions. Indeed, this 
problem is linked to moral hazard, which is made possible by the non-observability of the agent's (borrower's) 
behavior by the principal (the lending institution). This is reflected in the fact that at maturity, some borrowers do 
not respect their commitment and gradually drift towards non-payment, which definitively degrades the quality of 
the credit portfolio. As a result, incentive mechanisms based on the role of supervisors become effective means of 
encouraging some borrowers to positively change their repayment behavior and reduce their risk of default. These 
effects are rather significant on the behavior of borrowers who are incentive-sensitive and therefore adopt maturity 
compliance behavior, while borrowers who are not attracted by such incentives will continue to be highly exposed 
to default risk. 
In this study, we proceeded in different steps to analyze the credit repayment behavior of borrowers. The first two 
steps, the Logit model and the Poisson model, allowed us to check whether the incentive mechanisms proposed 
by the supervisors contributed positively and significantly to the borrowers' compliance behavior. Subsequently, 
we used the Kaplan-Meier and Cox models to analyze the influence of incentive mechanisms on the credit’ life-
time.  
The findings of this research lead to the following management and business policies for contractual relationships 
involving a principal and an agent with asymmetric information. 1-The types of incentive mechanisms should be 
diversified in order to better assess the distinct effects of each incentive mechanism on the change in agents' 
behaviour. 2-Supervisory incentives are significantly powerful mechanisms for agents' behavior analysis and also 
appear as dynamic incentives that structurally affect the medium to long-term performance of contracts. 
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Notes 
Note 1. PADME was considered to be one of the best microfinance institutions in West Africa with higher 
repayment rate of borrowers. That lending institution was selected because of the opportunities given to learn 
about the non-market institutions such as endorsement and sponsorship practices involved in lending contracts. 
Note 2. For each maturity, we check if the borrower has repaid the loan before the maturity date. Otherwise, a late 
payment penalty is imposed. It is therefore the number of penalties that determines the number of delays according 
to the number of maturities. 
Note 3. Death refers to the end of the credit cycle. This means that no longer the lender decides to extend any more 
credit to the borrower and thus eject him from the loan portfolio. 
 
 
 
